Don't Arm Ukraine
The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia
is winning. The separatists in eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and
Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, shows no signs of backing down in
the face of Western economic sanctions.
Unsurprisingly,
a growing chorus of voices in the United States is calling for arming
Ukraine. A recent report from three leading American think tanks
endorses sending Kiev advanced weaponry, and the White House’s nominee
for secretary of defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate
armed services committee, “I very much incline in that direction.”
They
are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the United
States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending weapons to Ukraine will not
rescue its army and will instead lead to an escalation in the fighting.
Such a step is especially dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest.
There
is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned by the
separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side. Because
the balance of power decisively favors Moscow, Washington would have to
send large amounts of equipment for Ukraine’s army to have a fighting
chance.
But
the conflict will not end there. Russia would counter-escalate, taking
away any temporary benefit Kiev might get from American arms. The
authors of the think tank study concede this, noting that “even with
enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian Army will not be able to
defeat a determined attack by the Russian military.” In short, the
United States cannot win an arms race with Russia over Ukraine and
thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield.
Proponents
of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument. The key to success,
they maintain, is not to defeat Russia militarily, but to raise the
costs of fighting to the point where Mr. Putin will cave. The pain will
supposedly compel Moscow to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and allow
it to join the European Union and NATO and become an ally of the West.
This
coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much
punishment the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to
understand is that Russian leaders believe their country’s core
strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give
ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.
Great
powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into
their neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border
an ally. This is why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and
today no American leader would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a
military alliance headed by another great power.
Russia
is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. Putin has not budged in the
face of sanctions and is unlikely to make meaningful concessions if the
costs of the fighting in Ukraine increase.
Upping
the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not only would the
fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify, but it could also
spread to other areas. The consequences for Ukraine, which already faces
profound economic and social problems, would be disastrous.
The
possibility that Mr. Putin might end up making nuclear threats may seem
remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to drive up the costs of
Russian interference and eventually put Moscow in an acute situation, it
cannot be ruled out. If Western pressure succeeded and Mr. Putin felt
desperate, he would have a powerful incentive to try to rescue the
situation by rattling the nuclear saber.
Our
understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and war is
limited at best, although we know the risks are considerable. Pushing a
nuclear-armed Russia into a corner would be playing with fire.
Advocates
of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem, which is why they
stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not “offensive,” weapons. Unfortunately,
there is no useful distinction between these categories: All weapons
can be used for attacking and defending. The West can be sure, though,
that Moscow will not see those American weapons as “defensive,” given
that Washington is determined to reverse the status quo in eastern
Ukraine.
The
only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily.
Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as
she has said Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however,
is that she does not know how to bring the crisis to an end.
She
and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine
can be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and
that Russian leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.
To
save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow,
the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between
Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward
that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO
expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned
Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies
should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal that
is clearly in everyone’s interest.
It
is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and
that Kiev regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of
Donetsk and Luhansk should be given substantial autonomy, and protection
for Russian language rights should be a top priority.
Crimea,
a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European Union
up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that
imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to
relations between Russia and the West.
John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is the author of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”
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