Kosovo Chaos Undercuts
Clinton ‘Success’
President Bill Clinton’s Kosovo war of 1999 was loved by neocons and liberal hawks – the forerunner for Iraq, Libya, Syria and other conflicts this century – but Kosovo’s political violence and lawlessness today underscore the grim consequences of those strategies even when they “succeed,” writes Jonathan Marshall.
By Jonathan Marshall
February
21, 2016
Source: Consortium News
The insatiable
appetite of America’s bipartisan foreign policy elites for military
intervention — despite its record of creating failing states in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen — traces back to the marriage of liberal and
neoconservative interventionists during the Clinton administration’s 78-day
bombing of Serbia to create the break-away state of Kosovo in 1999.
One
scholar-advocate has called NATO’s campaign “The most important precedent
supporting the legitimacy of unilateral humanitarian intervention.” Even
Sen. Bernie Sanders was proud to support that
use of American power, ostensibly “to prevent further genocide.”
The Late US Amb. Richard Holbrooke with an UCK commander, summer 1998. KLA Leaders have denied any responsibility for the war and post-war violence
But Kosovo,
which is still not recognized as an independent state by
nearly half of all UN members, and which still relies on 4,600 NATO troops to maintain order, is
hardly a showcase for the benefits of military intervention. With an unemployment rate of 35 percent, Kosovo
is wracked by persistent outbreaks of terrorism, crime, and political
violence.
Following a
series of violent street protests and wild disruptions of parliament, the
leader of the radical nationalist party, Vetëvendosje, announced on Feb. 19, “This regime is now
is in its final days. They will not last long.”
That day,
members of Vetëvendosje set off tear gas cannisters in parliament and tussled
with police in the latest of their many protests against an agreement reached by the government last
summer to grant limited powers to the country’s Serbian minority, in return for
Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo. Opposition lawmakers also rail against endemic
corruption and the country’s under-performing economy.
Two days
earlier, at least 15,000 Kosovars gathered in the central square of
Pristina, the country’s capital, to demand the government’s resignation. In
January, thousands of protesters clashed with police, hurling Molotov
cocktails, setting a major government building and armored police
cars on fire, and wounding 24 police officers.
“The aim of
this protest was to overthrow the government with violence,” the government
said in a statement. The U.S. ambassador chimed in, “Political violence
threatens democracy and all that Kosovo has achieved since independence.”
This violence
gets little attention from the American media in part because, unlike the
Ukrainian demonstrators who overthrew their democratically elected government
in 2014, Kosovo’s protesters are targeting a pro-Western government that
eagerly seeks membership in the European Union.
But it’s no
wonder that Kosovo’s political fabric is so rent by violent confrontations. The
rump state was created by a violent secessionist movement led by the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA). That guerrilla band of Albanian nationalists was covertly backed by the German secret service to
weaken Serbia. Its terrorist attacks on Serbian villages and government
personnel in the mid-1990s prompted a brutal military crackdown by Serbia,
followed by NATO’s decisive intervention in 1999.
During the
fighting the KLA drove tens of thousands of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo as part of
an ethnic cleansing campaign to promote independence for the majority Albanian
population. Itrecruited Islamist militants — including
followers of Osama Bin Laden — from Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
Afghanistan and other countries.
President Bill
Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, called the KLA “without any question, a
terrorist group,” and a Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder added, “most of its
activities were funded by drug running.”
None of that,
however, stopped Washington from embracing the KLA’s cause against Serbia, a
policy spearheaded by the liberal interventionist First Lady
Hillary Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Without authorization from the United Nations, NATO began bombing Serbia in
March 1999, killing some 500 civilians, demolishing
billions of dollars’ worth of industrial plants, bridges, schools, libraries and hospitals, and even
hitting the Chinese embassy. (“It should be lights out in Belgrade,” demanded New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman. “Every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war-related
factory has to be targeted. Like it or not, we are at war with the Serbian
nation.”)
Following
Serbia’s capitulation, according to Human Rights Watch, “elements of
the KLA” engaged in “widespread and systematic burning and looting of homes
belonging to Serbs, Roma, and other minorities and the destruction of Orthodox
churches and monasteries. This destruction was combined with harassment and
intimidation designed to force people from their homes and communities. By
late-2000 more than 210,000 Serbs had fled the province . . . The desire for
revenge provides a partial explanation, but there is also a clear political
goal in many of these attacks: the removal from Kosovo of non-ethnic Albanians
in order to better justify an independent state.”
Former KLA
leaders, including its political head Hashim Thaçi, went on to dominate the new
Kosovo state. A 2010 report by the Council of Europe declared
that Thaçi, who was then Kosovo’s prime minister, headed a “mafia-like” group
that smuggled drugs, guns and human organs on a grand scale through Eastern
Europe. The report’s author accused the international community of
turning a blind eye while Thaçi’s group of KLA veterans engaged in
“assassinations, detentions, beatings and interrogations” to maintain power and
profit from their criminal activities.
Prime Minister
Thaçi and the Kosovo government strenuously denied the allegations and
succeeded for years in resisting accountability. Their American
friends were eager to put the past behind as well. In 2012, Madeleine Albright
and a former Clinton special envoy to the Balkans bid to take control of the country’s state-owned
telecommunications company despite widespread allegations of
corruption, the attempted assassination of the telecommunications regulatory
chief, and themurder of the state privatization agency’s chief.
No one seemed
immune from corruption. A study of the European Union’s own legal
mission to Kosovo suggested that its members may have taken bribes to drop
investigations of senior Kosovo politicians for rampant criminal activity.
In 2014, a
three-year E.U. investigation concluded that “senior officials of the
former Kosovo Liberation Army” should be indicted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity, including “unlawful killings, abductions, enforced
disappearances, illegal detentions in camps in Kosovo and Albania, sexual
violence, other forms of inhumane treatment, forced displacements of
individuals from their homes and communities, and desecration and destruction
of churches and other religious sites.”
Under tough
pressure from the United States and E.U., Kosovo’s parliament finally agreed last summer to permit a special
court to prosecute former KLA leaders for war crimes. The court willbegin
operating this year in The Hague.
“The sad thing
is that the United States and European countries knew 10 years ago that Thaçi
and his men were engaged in drug smuggling and creating a mafia state,” said one European ambassador last year.
“The attitude was, ‘He’s a bastard, but he’s our bastard.’”
Whether delayed
justice will clean up Kosovo’s “mafia state,” and whether belated granting of
rights to the Serbian minority will ease or aggravate Kosovo’s explosive ethnic
tensions, remain to be seen. One thing’s for sure: a great many people have
died in the name of this great “humanitarian intervention,” and many more are
still suffering for it. Kosovo is no Libya or Syria, but neither is it any kind
of showcase for the benefits of U.S. armed intervention.
___________________________
Jonathan
Marshall is author or co-author of five books on international affairs,
including The Lebanese Connection: Corruption, Civil War and the
International Drug Traffic (Stanford University
Press, 2012). Some of his previous articles for Consortiumnews were “Risky Blowback from Russian Sanctions”; “Neocons Want Regime Change in Iran”; “Saudi Cash Wins France’s Favor”; “The Saudis’ Hurt Feelings”; “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Bluster”; “The US Hand in the Syrian Mess”; and “Hidden Origins of Syria’s Civil War.” ]
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