An Israeli View: A fleeting opportunity, (excerpt) Yossi Melman Senior commentator, Haaretz, first posted June 23, 2009

For 15 years, IDF Intelligence and the Mossad have regularly altered their assessment regarding the date when Iran's nuclear program becomes operational. The deadline has been constantly pushed forward, from the late 1990s to the beginning and then the middle of this decade and finally to 2009-2010. And now suddenly, out of the blue, 2014. These frequent fluctuations damage the reputation of Israel's intelligence agencies worldwide and confuse the public. Israeli intelligence estimates have been perceived by many in the world as "alarmist" and designed to serve political and diplomatic goals.

In saying that the deadline for an Iranian bomb is 2014, Dagan accepted a CIA assessment that Israel had criticized in the past. The CIA has repeatedly and consistently determined that Iran would have its first bomb not before 2015.

Seemingly, there is no direct connection between the semi-revolution that has been taking place in the streets of Iran and the Mossad analysis. Conceivably, Dagan unintentionally and even innocently introduced his estimate in the midst of the Iranian crisis. But the timing of his declaration evidently proves the opposite. Knowing the cunning and calculated chief of Mossad, one wonders why he chose this occasion to publicize his estimate and did not wait, say, for a few weeks or at least days. Thus, it should not be ruled out that he has a hidden personal or organizational agenda.

One way or another, Dagan effectively undermined the "party line" and the agenda of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who only a few weeks ago tried to convince the US administration that "Iran [must come] first". Netanyahu and his government, which are not ready to freeze the settlements, withdraw from the West Bank and enter into a peace deal with the PLO, hoped to persuade the world that the Iranian nuclear threat is more dangerous and acute not only for Israel but for the stability of the Middle East and that it therefore requires immediate attention while the rest--peace with the Palestinians and Syria--could wait.

No more. Not only has a military option, i.e., an attack by the Israel Air Force on Iranian nuclear installations, become remote, but Israel has also lost its Iranian excuse not to accelerate peace negotiations with the Palestinians.

Still, this severe home-made blow to Netanyahu's hopes and plans is balanced by another ramification favorable to Israel. Iran's foreign and defense policy--its nuclear program and support for Hamas and Hizballah--has not been a real issue in motivating the demonstrations and protests. True, during the election campaign opposition leader Mir Hussein Mousavi publicly expressed his opinion that President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's provocative statements don't serve Iran's national interests and image abroad. Nevertheless, foreign policy issues are a minor factor in these demonstrations, if at all.

Yet, regardless of the final outcome of the crisis and even if Ahmadinezhad is reinstated, the ayatollahs' regime has clearly suffered a major blow, its self-confidence shaken. This will force the regime to devote more time, energy and resources to fixing the economy and trying to accommodate some of the concerns raised by the demonstrators. Foreign policy is bound to be a lesser priority.

The first victims of such a development will be Hamas and Hizballah. They will most probably be marginalized in the Iranian's regime's inner discourse and will get less financial, military, diplomatic and moral support from their Iranian benefactors.